The work of a traffic lawyer is to help you get out of the troubles you face. The troubles can start with a small ticket to imprisonment for committing an offence while driving. Abiding by the law is important. If you do not follow the law, you will get a ticket. Many people get a shock when they receive a ticket. They do not even know what went wrong. It is after they look at the ticket to find out that they break the law. You may cross a road while driving where you are not allowed to cross it. For example, if you are driving and you cross the road with a solid yellow line, you are breaking the law. It means you break the rules. If you are in Roanoke Virginia, you should know that crossing over is a crime where there is a solid yellow line on the road. In such a case, if you see that the ticket is a huge amount, you should take legal help. These road signs and signals are important. Many people fail to follow these signs and end up having a ticket.
The ticket
The ticket may not be a big problem, but the problem is when the state adds points to your DMV record. If you commit an offence such as reckless driving, it will remain on your record for 11 years. A small wrong turn may be on your record for two years. Once you receive a ticket for breaking the law, make sure that you do not do the same offence again. The next time you face charges, you will have to pay double fine and may also have more punishments such as cancelation of your license.
The only way to get out of trouble when you are facing heavy traffic charges is by hiring an expert lawyer. Make sure that you find the best and the most reliable attorney in Roanoke. Virginia imposes strict and immediate punishments for breaking the laws. Also, if you receive a ticket and do not pay within the specified time, the court will charge you with another offence. So, you should hurry and pay the ticket or hire an attorney who will help you get away with the charges.
The penalties
There are several penalties for breaking laws while driving. You can face both the administrative and criminal penalties. You may have to pay a heavy fine. The judge may refer you to an administrative program for the next year. You may not be allowed to drive for a specific period. Above all, it will ruin your driving record.
Hiring expert traffic lawyers in Virginia
To get out of trouble, you should hire expert traffic lawyers. Hire the expert lawyers who know the Virginia laws and rules for traffic. They will handle your case with proficiency. They will make sure that you do not face a maximum penalty or even get away with the full pardon. They will try their best.
The following are some of the traffic laws in VA:
VA Code § 46.2-870. Maximum speed limits generally.
Except as otherwise provided in this article, the maximum speed limit shall be 55 miles per hour on interstate highways or other limited access highways with divided roadways, nonlimited access highways having four or more lanes, and all state primary highways.
The maximum speed limit on all other highways shall be 55 miles per hour if the vehicle is a passenger motor vehicle, bus, pickup or panel truck, or a motorcycle, but 45 miles per hour on such highways if the vehicle is a truck, tractor truck, or combination of vehicles designed to transport property, or is a motor vehicle being used to tow a vehicle designed for self-propulsion, or a house trailer.
Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this section, the maximum speed limit shall be 70 miles per hour where indicated by lawfully placed signs, erected subsequent to a traffic engineering study and analysis of available and appropriate accident and law-enforcement data, on: (i) interstate highways, (ii) multilane, divided, limited access highways, and (iii) high-occupancy vehicle lanes if such lanes are physically separated from regular travel lanes. The maximum speed limit shall be 60 miles per hour where indicated by lawfully placed signs, erected subsequent to a traffic engineering study and analysis of available and appropriate accident and law-enforcement data, on U.S. Route 29, U.S. Route 58, U.S. Route 360, U.S. Route 460, and on U.S. Route 17 between the town of Port Royal and Saluda where they are nonlimited access, multilane, divided highways.
§ 46.2-862. Exceeding speed limit.
A person shall be guilty of reckless driving who drives a motor vehicle on the highways in the Commonwealth (i) at a speed of twenty miles per hour or more in excess of the applicable maximum speed limit or (ii) in excess of eighty miles per hour regardless of the applicable maximum speed limit.
The following is a case that is illustrative of a driving license revocation case:
This appeal by the VA Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) is from an order of the Circuit Court of Buchanan County (trial court) that set aside the revocation and suspension of Roger Eulis Hale’s (appellee) “driver’s license, registration certificate and license plates,” and ordered that they be reinstated. For the reasons stated, we reverse the decision of the trial court.
In lieu of a transcript, pursuant to Rule 5A:8(C), the parties stipulated to the following facts:
Appellee held a VA operator’s permit. On April 13, 1991, while in Bristol, Tennessee, he was arrested and charged pursuant to Tennessee law with “driving under the influence by consent.” On April 24, 1991, a Tennessee court convicted him of “driving under the influence.” Based upon that conviction, the DMV administratively revoked appellee’s VA operator’s permit. That revocation action is the subject of this appeal.
Upon notice of the DMV’s action, appellee sought and received from the trial court a temporary stay of the revocation until the validity of the administrative action could be determined. The trial ct subsequently granted an extension of the stay “to allow appellee’s attorney an opportunity to have Tennessee’s officials amend or modify their records to reflect a conviction of driving by consent rather than driving under the influence.” On January 24, 1992, at the hearing on the merits of his appeal, appellee advised the trial ct that the Tennessee ct had refused to alter its records. The trial ct nevertheless found that appellee had been “convicted in the State of Tennessee of ‘driving under the influence by consent,'” which “does not constitute an offense under Section 18.2-266.”
The sole question presented by this appeal is whether substantial evidence in this record supports the revocation order issued by the DMV. See Code § 46.2-410; Code § 9-6.14:17; Turner v. Jackson, 14 Va. App. 423, 429-30, 417 S.E.2d 881, 886 (1992). To answer that question, we must determine (1) whether the record establishes that appellee was convicted of driving under the influence in Tennessee, and (2) if so, whether Tennessee’s statute prohibiting such conduct parallels and substantially conforms to Code § 18.2-266, the VA statute that prohibits driving under the influence.
The record reveals an affidavit of complaint that shows appellee’s signature on a plea of guilty to the offense of “DUI.” Further, the Tennessee Orders and Judgment document identified appellee’s conviction as a “DUI” conviction. Additionally, the Tennessee ct, upon review, declined to amend or modify appellee’s conviction order. This record clearly establishes that appellee pled guilty to and was convicted of the offense of driving under the influence of intoxicants.
Code § 46.2-389, Va’s revocation statute, provides, in pertinent part:
- The Commissioner shall forthwith revoke, and not thereafter reissue for one year, except as provided in § 18.2-271 or § 18.2-271.1, the driver’s license, registration card, and license plates of any resident or nonresident on receiving a record of his conviction . . . of any of the following crimes, committed in violation of either a state law or a valid county, city, or town ordinance paralleling and substantially conforming to a like state law and to all changes and amendments of it:
- Violation of § 18.2-266 . . . .
Thus, when the record establishes a valid out-of-state conviction, as it does in this case, we need only compare the elements of the two statutes. If the elements “parallel and substantially conform,” the requirements of Code § 46.2-389 are satisfied, mandating an automatic license revocation by the DMV. We must now determine whether Tenn. Code § 55-10-401, the statute that prohibits driving while under the influence of intoxicants in Tennessee, parallels and substantially conforms to Code § 18.2-266, which prohibits driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated in VA.
Code § 18.2-266 reads, in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person to drive or operate any motor vehicle, engine or train (i) while such person has a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10 percent or more by weight by volume as indicated by a chemical test administered in accordance with the provisions of § 18.2-268, (ii) while such person is under the influence of alcohol, (iii) while such person is under the influence of any narcotic drug or any other self-administered intoxicant or drug of whatsoever nature, or any combination of such drugs, to a degree which impairs his ability to drive or operate any motor vehicle, engine or train safely, or (iv) while such person is under the combined influence of alcohol and any drug or drugs to a degree which impairs his ability to drive or operate any motor vehicle, engine or train safely.
Tenn. Code § 55-10-401 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person or persons to drive or to be in physical control of any automobile or other motor driven vehicle on any of the public roads and highways of the state of Tennessee, or on any streets or alleys, or while on the premises of any shopping center, trailer park or any apartment house complex, or any other premises which is generally frequented by the public at large, while under the influence of any intoxicant, marijuana, narcotic drug, or drug producing stimulating effects on the central nervous system.
The Tennessee statute prohibits “any person . . . to drive
. . . any automobile . . . while under the influence of any intoxicant.” Code § 18.2-266 prohibits “any person to drive
. . . any motor vehicle . . . (ii) while . . . under the influence of alcohol, or (iii) . . . under the influence of any narcotic drug . . . to a degree which impairs his ability to drive or operate any motor vehicle . . . safely . . . .” With respect to driving while under the influence of alcohol, the statutes are clearly “paralleling and substantially conforming.”
Although the Tennessee statute does not contain the language, “impairs his ability to drive . . . safely,” with respect to drug offenses, we find that proof under Tennessee’s statute that a person is “under the influence of any intoxicant” is sufficiently comparable to proof under Code § 18.2-266 that the person’s ability to drive safely is impaired. “Another state’s law regarding driving while under the influence of intoxicants or drugs need not substantially conform in every respect to Code § 18.2-266.” Cox v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 328, 331, 411 S.E.2d 444, 446 (1991). 1The legislature clearly anticipated differences in other state’s statutes as it merely required that such statutes “substantially” conform to a like state law. Thus, we find that Tenn. Code § 55-10-401, under which appellee was convicted, parallels and substantially conforms to Code § 18.2-266, and that the revocation of appellee’s driver’s license by the DMV, pursuant to Code § 46.2-389, was proper.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial ct is reversed and the order of the DMV reinstated.
Reversed.
Dissent by: BENTON
Dissent
BENTON, J., dissenting.
The trial judge held that Tennessee’s driving under the influence statute did not parallel and substantially conform to Code § 18.2-266, Virginia’s driving under the influence statute. 2Consequently, the trial judge ruled that the Department could not have properly used the Tennessee conviction as a basis upon which to revoke Hale’s license to drive. I would affirm the judgment.
The relevant part of Virginia’s revocation statute reads as follows:
The Commissioner shall forthwith revoke, and not thereafter reissue for one year, except as provided in § 18.2-271 or § 18.2-271.1, the driver’s license, registration card, and license plates of any resident or nonresident on receiving a record of his conviction or a record of his having been found guilty in the case of a juvenile of any of the several enumerated crimes, committed in violation of either a state law or a valid county, city, or town ordinance parallelling and substantially conforming to a like state law and to all changes and amendments of it:
Code § 46.2-389(A). Thus, before the Department can revoke a person’s driver’s license, that person must have been convicted of violating one of the enumerated v offenses or the law of another jurisdiction that parallels and substantially conforms to one of the enumerated v offenses. “The Commonwealth bears the burden of proving that an out-of-state conviction was obtained under laws substantially similar to those of the Commonwealth.” Shinault v. Commonwealth, 228 v. 269, 271, 321 S.E.2d 652, 654 (1984). 0
Code § 18.2-266 prohibits driving under the influence in v and it is an offense enumerated under Code § 46.2-389(2). The Department contends that Tennessee’s statute prohibiting such conduct parallels and substantially conforms to Code § 18.2-266. The relevant part of Tennessee’s statute that prohibits driving while under the influence of intoxicants reads as follows, however:
It shall be unlawful for any person or persons to drive or to be in physical control of any automobile or other motor driven vehicle on any of the public roads and highways of the state of Tennessee, or on any streets or alleys, or while on the premises of any shopping center, trailer park or any apartment house complex, or any other premises which is generally frequented by the public at large, while under the influence of any intoxicant, marijuana, narcotic drug, or drug producing stimulating effects on the central nervous system.
Tenn. Code § 55-10-401(a).
The Tennessee charging document in this record recites that a Tennessee police officer stopped a pickup truck and arrested the driver for “DUI.” The document further states that because Hale was a passenger and owned the truck, the officer also arrested Hale and charged him with “DUI by consent.” The abstract of conviction from Tennessee indicates that Hale was charged with “driving under the influence of alcoholic beverages and/or drugs by consent and possession of marijuana.” It further indicates that Hale was convicted of “DUI.” The abstract does not specify, however, whether the “DUI” conviction was based upon driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. The lack of specificity is significant because the Tennessee statutory elements proscribe drug and alcohol offenses in a like fashion. However, the v statute does not. The Tennessee statute prohibits “any person … to drive … any automobile … while under the influence of any intoxicant.” Tenn. Code § 55-10-401. That prohibition parallels and substantially conforms to the Virginia statute that prohibits “any person to drive … any motor vehicle … while … under the influence of alcohol.” Code § 18.2-266 (ii).
The Tennessee statute addresses drug offenses in the same manner as it addresses alcohol offenses. It prohibits “any person … to drive … any automobile … while under the influence of … marijuana, narcotic drug, or drug producing stimulating effects on the central nervous system.” Tenn. Code § 55-10-401. However, the v statute contains an additional element that must be proved for drug offenses. It prohibits “any person to drive … any motor vehicle … while such person is under the influence of any … drug … to a degree which impairs his ability to drive.” Code § 18.2-266 (iii) (emphasis added). Thus, in Virginia proving only that a driver is under the influence of a drug does not suffice to prove the offense.
The difference in the elements that must be proved under the Tennessee statute, on the one hand, and under the Virginia statute, on the other, is substantial. A conviction may be had under the Tennessee statute merely by proving that the driver was driving under the influence of any intoxicant. Proving only those elements will not suffice in Virginia. Under the Virginia statute, the evidence must further prove that the driver was impaired to a degree that affected the driver’s ability to drive. With such a fundamental difference, the statutes are not “parallelling and substantially conforming” within the meaning of Code § 46.2-389. See Shinault, 228 v. at 272, 321 S.E.2d at 654. “In other words, if a person may be convicted of an offense under another jurisdiction’s statute for conduct which might not result in a conviction under Code § 18.2-270, the statutes are not ‘substantially conforming.'” Cox v. Commonwealth, 13 v. App. 328, 330-31, 411 S.E.2d 444, 446 (1991).
For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the trial ct. Accordingly, I dissent.